Harry Targ
Both unity and contradiction are reflected in the
history of United States foreign policy from the industrial revolution to the
present. The unity of policy in time and space is reflected in the drive to
maximize the opportunities for U.S. capital to expand; to acquire more and
more wealth, and to seize land, extract resources, and accumulate profits
derived from cheaper and cheaper labor.
An example of a significant historical moment
reflecting this unity can be seen in the 1890s as the United States seized
former Spanish colonies in the Caribbean and the Philippine Islands. Over the
next 30 years the U.S. military invaded and occupied Caribbean, Central
American and Latin American countries at least 30 times.
After World War II the United States penetrated
Western European economies using economic assistance as a tool, launched a
military alliance (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO), created the
largest most expensive military in the world, participated in wars costing
millions of lives, and was instrumental in establishing an international
financial and trading regime that maximized the opportunities for capitalist
countries in the global economy.
From time to time, the drive for U.S. global
hegemony was challenged by opposing forces (revolutions, international
communist alliances, anti-colonial movements, resistance and revolutionary
movements opposing external control, and competition initiated by other states
competing for power and profit).
Given the historical United States drive for hegemony,
which has its roots in the post-Civil War period in an increasingly resistant
global society, U. S. policymakers have debated the relative necessity of
adopting different tactics to maintain or enhance the U.S. global role. Since
World War II, the globalists as I call them, or the neoconservatives as they
are commonly identified, have urged presidents and key foreign and military
policy elites to exercise maximum military, political, and economic power to
advance U.S. interests.
From President Truman’s call for a struggle against international communism, to the recommendation in National Security Council Document 68 that military buildup be the nation’s number one priority, to John Kennedy’s idealistic call for the U.S. to lead in world transformation, the call for global hegemony was presented to the citizenry. More recently, Ronald Reagan’s doctrine promising the liberation of the world from communism to George Walker Bush’s proclamation that nations are either with us or with the enemy, a global policy of conquest was implemented.
From President Truman’s call for a struggle against international communism, to the recommendation in National Security Council Document 68 that military buildup be the nation’s number one priority, to John Kennedy’s idealistic call for the U.S. to lead in world transformation, the call for global hegemony was presented to the citizenry. More recently, Ronald Reagan’s doctrine promising the liberation of the world from communism to George Walker Bush’s proclamation that nations are either with us or with the enemy, a global policy of conquest was implemented.
Alternatively, some foreign policy decision makers
and pundits from time to time recommend more modest articulation of goals and
the use of a broad array of tactics to achieve hegemonic goals that do not rely
primarily on military superiority. President Eisenhower in eight years
overthrew governments in Iran and Guatemala, began planning the seeds of
destruction in Vietnam, proclaimed a special U.S role in the Middle East but at
the same time called for deescalation of the arms race with the Soviet Union,
participated in dialogue with its leader, and resisted pressures from both
liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans to spend more on the military.
Jimmy Carter came into office with an articulated
human rights agenda and for a time acted critically against military
dictatorships in Latin America, advocated democratization in then
apartheid-South Africa, and began modest relations with Cuba.
A significant feature of the Clinton-era foreign
policy agenda was about economics. The United States engaged in bombing campaigns
against presumed enemies in the former Yugoslavia, but the major part of his
administration’s foreign policy was about economics and not military
interventionism.
By the time Obama was campaigning for the presidency
in 2008, competing positions on United States foreign policy had begun to be
broadly debated. These debates, in the past as well as the present, have never
been about whether the United States should be “the indispensable nation,” but
rather about whether in achieving its goals, the nation should prioritize the
use of military tools or should use diplomacy and economics (what some pundits
have called “soft power”).
While many Obama supporters opposed the traditional
U.S. pursuit of an imperial agenda generally embraced by political elites in
both parties, they saw in the Obama candidacy a leader who would resist the use
of the military to achieve national goals. The pragmatists in the Obama
administration would advocate the use of diplomacy more and force less and
consequently the frequency and escalation of war and violence would decline.
Obama’s record has been mixed at best as the
candidate of the pragmatists as opposed to the globalists. He escalated U.S.
military involvement in Afghanistan, intervened in an escalating civil war in
Libya, supplied various alleged “moderate” groups fighting regimes it opposed
such as in Syria, and expanded the brutal drone attacks on civilians in several
countries. In addition he has supported the same covert operators who have
spent years undermining populist regimes in Latin America and the U.S. looked
the other way when reactionary forces overthrew a democratically-elected
government in Honduras.
On the other hand, Obama argued for negotiations
with Middle East/Gulf enemy number one, Iran. He has partnered with Vladimir
Putin, leader of Russia, to make some kind of agreement with Iran on nuclear
weapons developments a possibility. And Obama has begun the process of
normalizing relations with Cuba.
Now President Obama is confronted by two crises:
Islamic fundamentalist attacks against various regimes in the Gulf and Middle
East and the other, the civil war in Ukraine. In both cases Obama is, on the
one hand, opting for a globalist response and, on the other hand, is arguing
for the more pragmatic approach. Prior presidents shifted from one kind of
policy implementation to another as external circumstances and domestic
politics required. Beginning in 2015, President Obama has been advocating for both foreign policy positions at the same
time in each issue area.
While Obama promises no boots on the ground he
declares that the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) will be destroyed. Over 2,000
bombing raids on targets in Iraq and Syria have been carried out since last
summer by American and allied bombers. There is no hint at negotiations here.
The declared purpose is to physically destroy the enemy. Phyllis Bennis has
powerfully argued that neither policymakers nor pundits have tried to
understand why ISIS and its supporters engage in violence and terrorist acts.
But, Obama has asked Congress to vote formal authority for him to continue the
war on ISIS but only for three more years. We will continue the slaughter but
only for so long. The President had hoped that this proposal would satisfy both
the neoconservatives and the pragmatists among foreign policy activists.
As to Ukraine, Obama, like European allies, wish to
avoid a widening war in Central Europe that could lead to a new Cold War or Hot
War between the West and Russia. So the President is willing to support
negotiations between Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine, and Russia but he also
urges Congress to allocate military resources to further arm the Kiev
government. When analysts, such as scholar Stephen Cohen, suggest that the
Russian support of eastern Ukrainian separatists has something to do with their
concerns about an eastward expansion of NATO, the claim is ignored or not
reported at all. Media pundits see no reason why Russians and pro-Russian
Ukrainians would fear NATO or the descendants of Ukrainian fascists from the
World War II era who have influence over the Kiev government.
So Obama administration foreign policy today
reflects a unity of contradictory United
States foreign policies that have been key features of the U.S. role in the
world ever since its emergence as a superpower. All the contradictions borne of
a drive to dominate and the resistance it causes are coming to a head today.
This is a critical juncture for the peace movement.
The calls for economic conversion from militarism to domestic spending, a new
foreign policy that respects human rights and peoples’ sovereignty, and a
militant demand to end war and violence as a tool of United States foreign
policy need to be heard loud and clear.