Harry Targ
As many as153 schoolgirls died in bombing
attacks by Israel as the war on Iran started.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/least-24-girls-killed-us-strike-elementary-school-southern-iran
“The leadership of the Democratic Party fails to
fully object to Trump's bloody war on Iran. Dissident voices, such as
Congresswomen AOC, Tlaib, Senator Sanders and few more, are the exceptions.
What is notable is the silence at local levels, local Democratic Party
organizations and groups like Indivisible. Local activists need to recognize
the connection between economic and political issues at home and the support of
the people election day and the great war/peace issues of our day.” (Harry
Targ, posted on Facebook, March 1, 2026)
“Along with the structural reasons
determining US imperial policy, our rulers are insane. This means our work
necessitates challenging the US permanent war economy and removing from office
this coterie of insane, inhumane leaders who control the vast US war machine.
We must apologize to Iranians, Gazans, Venezuelans, Cubans, Nigerians and
others for allowing US leaders to kill and starve their populations._
(Harry Targ posted on Facebook, February 28, 2026)
U.S. Imperialism in the Beginning
Modern imperialism is intimately connected to the globalization of capitalism,
the quest for enhanced military capabilities, geopolitical thinking, and
ideologies of national and racial superiority. The rise of the United States
empire occurred as the industrial revolution spread to North America after the
civil war. Farmers began to produce agricultural surpluses requiring overseas
customers, factories were built to produce iron, steel, textiles, and food
products, railroads were constructed to traverse the North American continent,
and financiers created large banks, trusts, and holding companies to parley
agricultural and manufacturing profits into huge concentrations of cash.
Perhaps the benchmark of the U.S. emergence as an imperial power was the
Spanish/Cuban/American war. The U.S. established its hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere, replacing the Spanish and challenging the British, and became an
Asian power, crushing rebellion and planting its military in the Philippines.
The empire has grown, despite resistance, to this day.
While U.S. expansion occurs wherever a vacuum of power
exists, and an opportunity to formally or informally control a regime and/or
territory, particular countries have had enduring salience for the U.S. Iran is
such a country.
Scale of Significance for U.S. Imperialism
To help understand the attention U.S. policy-makers give some countries, it is
possible to reflect on what is called here the Scale of Significance for U.S.
Imperialism (SSUSI). The SSUSI has three interconnected dimensions that relate
to the relative importance policymakers give to some countries compared to
others.
First, as an original motivation for expansion, economic interests are primary.
Historically, United States policy has been driven by the need to secure
customers for U.S. products, outlets for manufacturing investment
opportunities, opportunities for financial speculation, and vital natural
resources.
Second, geopolitics and military hegemony matter. Empires require ready access
to regions and trouble spots all around the world. When Teddy Roosevelt, as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Vice President, and President of the United
States, articulated the first warning of the need for global power he spoke of
the development of a “two-ocean” navy. The U.S., he said, must become an
Atlantic and a Pacific power; thus prioritizing the projection of military
power in the Western Hemisphere and Asia. If the achievement of
global power was dependent upon resources drawn from everywhere, military and
political hegemony in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and parts of Africa
also required attention.
Third, as the imperial project grows, certain
political regimes and cultures take on particular importance for policymakers
and the American people. Foreign policy elites claim that the U.S. has a
special responsibility for them. If these roles are rejected by the targeted
country, the experience burns itself into the consciousness of the people. For
example, Cuba was seen by U.S. rulers as far back as Thomas Jefferson as soon
to be part of the United States. Cuba’s rejection of this presumption of U.S.
tutelage has been a scar on the U.S. sense of itself ever since the spread of
revolutionary ferment on the island.
Sixty Years of Blowback: Iran
Chalmers Johnson wrote in 2001 about “blowback” that
it “is a CIA term first used in March 1954 in a recently declassified
report on the 1953 operation to overthrow the government of Mohammed Mossadegh
in Iran. It is a metaphor for the unintended consequences of the US
government's international activities that have been kept secret from the
American people. The CIA's fears that there might ultimately be some blowback
from its egregious interference in the affairs of Iran were well founded.….
This misguided ‘covert operation’ of the US government helped convince many
capable people throughout the Islamic world that the United States was an
implacable enemy.” (The Nation, October 15, 2001).
The CIA initiated overthrow of the regime of Mohammed
Mossadegh sixty years ago on August 19, 1953, was precipitated by what Melvin
Gurtov called “the politics of oil and cold war together.” Because it was the
leading oil producer in the Middle East and the fourth largest in the world and
it was geographically close to the former Soviet Union, President Eisenhower
was prevailed upon to launch the CIA covert war on Iran long encouraged by
Great Britain.
The immediate background for the ouster of Mossadegh
was Iran’s nationalization of its oil production. Most Iranians were living in
poverty in the 1940s as the Iranian government received only ten percent of the
royalties on its oil sales on the world market. The discrepancy between Iran’s
large production of oil and the limited return it received led Prime Minister
Mohammed Mossadegh, a liberal nationalist, to call for the nationalization of
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. Despite opposition from Iran’s small
ruling class, the parliament and masses of the Iranian people endorsed the plan
to seize control of its oil. Mossadegh became the symbol of Iranian sovereignty.
Ironically, Mossadegh assumed the United States would
support Iran’s move toward economic autonomy. But, in Washington, the Iranian
leader was viewed as a demagogue, his emerging rival the Shah of Iran (the
sitting monarch of Iran) as “more moderate.”
After the nationalization, the British, supported by
the United States, boycotted oil produced by the Iranian Oil Company. The
British lobbied Washington to launch a military intervention but the Truman
Administration feared such an action would work to the advantage of the Iranian
Communists, the Tudeh Party.
The boycott led to economic strains in Iran, and
Mossadegh compensated for the loss of revenue by increasing taxes on the rich.
This generated growing opposition from the tiny ruling class, and they
encouraged political instability. In 1953, to rally his people, Mossadegh
carried out a plebiscite, a vote on his policies. The Iranian people
overwhelmingly endorsed the nationalization of Iranian oil. In addition,
Mossadegh initiated efforts to mend political fences with the former Soviet
Union and the Tudeh Party.
As a result of the plebiscite, and Mossadegh’s
openings to the Left, the United States came around to the British view;
Mossadegh had to go. As one U.S. defense department official put it:
“When the crisis came on and the thing was about to
collapse, we violated our normal criteria and among other things we did, we
provided the army immediately on an emergency basis….The guns that they had in
their hands, the trucks that they rode in, the armored cars that they drove
through the streets, and the radio communications that permitted their control,
were all furnished through the military defense assistance program…. Had it not
been for this program, a government unfriendly to the United States probably
would now be in power.” (Richard Barnet, Intervention and
Revolution, 1972).
The Shah, who had fled Iran after the plebiscite,
returned when Mossadegh was ousted. A new prime minister was appointed by him
who committed Iran to the defense of the “free” world. U.S. military and
economic aid was resumed, and Iran joined the CENTO alliance (an alliance of
pro-West regional states).
In August, 1954, a new oil consortium was established.
Five U.S. oil companies gained control of forty percent of Iranian oil, equal
to that of returning British firms. Iran compensated the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company for its losses by paying $70 million, which Iran received as aid from
the United States. The Iranian ruling class was accorded fifty percent of
profits from future oil sales. President Eisenhower declared that the events of
1953 and 1954 were ushering in a new era of “economic progress and stability”
in Iran and that it was now to be an independent country in “the family of free
nations.”
In brief, the United States overthrew a popularly
elected and overwhelmingly endorsed regime in Iran. The payoff the United
States received, with British acquiescence, was a dramatic increase in access
by U.S. oil companies to Iranian oil at the expense of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company. The overthrow of Mossadegh and the backing of the return of the Shah
to full control of the regime led to U.S. support for one of the world’s most
repressive and militarized regimes. By the 1970s, 70,000 of the Shah’s opponents
were in political prisons. Workers and religious activists rose up against the
Shah in 1979, leading to the rapid revolutionary overthrow of his military
state.
As Chalmers Johnson suggested many years later, the
United States role in the world is still plagued by “blowback.” Masses of
people all across the globe, particularly in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East,
and East Asia, regard the United States as the major threat to their economic
and political independence. And the covert operation against Mohammed Mossadegh
in Iran is one place where such global mistrust began.
Hybrid Wars Against Iran
from https://heartlandradical.blogspot.com/2020/01/hybrid-warswhat-is-new-and-what-is-not.html
Iran has been a country of particular concern of the United States at least
since the end of World War II. As suggested above, the US propped up the Shah
(Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) at the outset of the war to protect US bases which were
used to transfer war materials to the former Soviet Union. After Prime Minister
Mohammed Mossadegh, elected in 1951, nationalized Iran’s valuable oil resource,
Great Britain, whose Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had “owned “ the oil, began to
urge the US to overthrow the democratically elected Prime Minister, instill
full power in the monarch, the Shah, and reprivatize Iranian oil. In 1953 the
US Central Intelligence Agency launched a coup to overthrow the Prime Minister
and to establish the Shah as Iran’s all-powerful dictator. His brutality and
repression lasted for years until a mass-based worker and religious-led
movement ousted him from power in 1979. In the aftermath of the ouster of the
Shah, religious leaders consolidated their control of the state, the Shah fled
to the United States for medical treatment, the new regime demanded his return
to stand trial for his crimes, and Iranian students took 52 US embassy
personnel hostage for 444 days.
The United States responses to the transformation of the Iranian regime
included President Carter’s declaration of his “doctrine,” which proclaimed
that instabilities in the Persian Gulf region were vital to US national
security. The US began to fund Iraq in its eight-year bloody war against Iran,
which led to 500,000 Iranians killed. The United States urged Israel to invade
Lebanon, escalate attacks on Palestine, and in general tilted in opposition to
Iran and its allies in the region. The US also increased the sale of
technologically sophisticated arms to Saudi Arabia.
Therefore in the 1980s, US
policy in the Persian Gulf and Middle East regions was driven by the growing
hostility of Iran to the United States (once a pillar of US support in the
Persian Gulf), the continued need of Europe and Japan for Iranian oil, and
Iran’s vital geographic location, particularly in terms of its potential
control of the flow of oil to Europe and Japan. But, in
addition, the Iranian people had violated a cardinal rule of US global
hegemony. They had risen up against rule by an American puppet. Much like Cuba in the Western
Hemisphere, Iranians declared that they no longer would abide by a leader
chosen by the United States and not them. (In fact, in the Nixon
Administration, the Shah’s regime was identified as the key “gendarme” state in
the Persian Gulf, the local US police enforcer).
Ever since the hostage crisis of 1979, the United States has imposed economic
sanctions of one sort or another on Iran. After the long years of damage to the
Iranian economy and the people at large, the Nuclear Treaty of 2015 (the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action), was negotiated by Iran, the United States,
member countries of the European Union, and Security Council members, Russia
and China. Along with Iran’s promise to stop the production of potential
nuclear material, signatories agreed to end the freezing of Iranian assets
deposited in US and European banks, to eliminate various prohibitions on
Western investment in the Iranian economy, and to remove trade restrictions.
Almost immediately after the sanctions were lifted in the aftermath of the
Nuclear Treaty, the Iranian economy grew: a 12 percent growth in GDP in 2016
and an additional but modest 3.7 percent in 2017. However, in 2018 President
Trump withdrew from the Nuclear Treaty and re-imposed crippling sanctions. As a
result, the Iranian economy contracted by 4.8 percent in 2018 and in a BBC
report projected a further decline of 9.5 percent in 2019.
Iran’s oil exports and hence production was hit particularly hard. The value of
Iranian currency declined dramatically and inflation in the country rose,
particularly for the price of food. (BBC News. “Six Charts That Show How
Hard US Sanctions Have Hit Iran,” December 2, 2019). Sanctions reduced
purchasing power, increased the cost of living for food and transportation,
reduced access of Iranian students studying abroad to financial resources, and
led to the reduction of public services.
This is the story of hybrid war against Iran: along with military threats and
attempts to isolate Iran diplomatically, make the people suffer and cause
increased outrage at the material conditions of life. The hope is that the
people will rise up and overthrow the regime in power (and, of course,
instances of corruption and repression will magnify protest responses).
The scenario has been repeated over and over: Guatemala and Iran in the early
1950s, Cuba since 1960, and now Venezuela and Iran again. And make
no mistake about it: economic sanctions are targeted against civilian
populations and constitute a strategy of war against the people, motivating
them to rise up against their governments.
Returning to SSUSI and Iranian Relations
As an emerging global power, United States needs for natural resources,
customers for consumer and military products, investment opportunities, and
outlets for energy companies grew throughout the twentieth century. One of the
significant historical junctures in the transfer of economic and geopolitical
power in the world from the declining British empire and the rising U.S. empire
was the agreement to redistribute control of Iranian oil in 1954. The
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was obliged to share Iranian oil with the then five
U.S. oil giants.
As U.S. oil needs and those of its friends in Europe increased, control of the
Persian Gulf region and access to its oil became more vital. Furthermore, since
a hostile Iran could control the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian revolution of
1979 posed an increasing geopolitical problem for American dominance.
The impulse in 1979 to send U.S. troops to save the Shah’s regime was driven by
both economics and geopolitics. It was only because other Carter advisers
disagreed with the National Security Advisor on the possibility of saving the
Shah that a U.S. intervention stalled in 1979. But in 1980 an Iraq/Iran war
provided an opportunity, it was hoped, to weaken Iran’s potential control of
the region.
Finally, the U.S. decision-makers since 1953 saw a
special relationship between this country and Iran. The U.S. put the Shah in
power, plied him with enormous military power, encouraged and facilitated
significant cultural exchanges, and defined his regime as a junior partner in
policing the region.
The rapidity of the Shah’s overthrow and the anger
expressed by the Iranian people about its historic relationship to the American
people communicated to the world declining U.S. power. Consequently, U.S.
hostility to Iran in subsequent decades using a variety of issues including
processing uranium is not surprising.
The US Pursuit of Empire
Taking “the long view” of United States foreign
policy, it is clear that from NSC-68; to the response to the Soviet challenges
in space such as during the Sputnik era; to global wars in Korea, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, and Iraq; to covert interventions in the Middle East, Latin
America, Asia, and Africa, the United States has pursued global hegemony. And
foreign policy influentials, such as a recent Council on Foreign Relations
position paper suggests, regard the maintenance of global power the main
priority of foreign policy in the years ahead. It is also clear that the
pursuit of empire has, of necessity, involved the creation of a permanent war
economy, an economy that overcomes economic stagnation by the infusion of
enormous military expenditures.
It is also clear that justification for empire and military spending has
necessitated the construction of an enemy, first the Soviet Union and
international communism; then terrorism; and now China and most recently Iran.
The obverse of a demonic enemy requires a conception of self to justify the
imperial project. That self historically has been various iterations of
American exceptionalism, the indispensable nation, US humanitarianism, and
implicitly or explicitly the superiority of the white race and western civilization.
In this light, while specific policies vary, the trajectory of US foreign
policy in the twenty-first century is a continuation of the policies and
programs that were institutionalized in the twentieth century. Three seem
primary. First, military spending, particularly in new technologies, continues
unabated. And a significant Council on Foreign Relations report raises the
danger of the United States “falling behind,” the same metaphor that was used
by the writers of the NSC-68 document, or the Gaither and Rockefeller
Reports composed in the late 1950s to challenge
President Eisenhower’s worry about a
military/industrial complex, the response to Sputnik, Secretary of Defense
McNamara’s transformation of the Pentagon to scientific management in the
1960s, or President Reagan’s huge increase of armaments in the 1980s to
overcome the “window of vulnerability.”
Second, the United States continues to engage in
policies recently referred to as “hybrid wars.” The concept of hybrid wars
suggests that while traditional warfare between nations has declined, warfare
within countries has increased. Internal wars, the hybrid wars theorists
suggest, are encouraged and supported by covert interventions, employing
private armies, spies, and other operatives financed by outside nations like
the United States. Also the hybrid wars concept also refers to the use of
economic warfare, embargoes and blockades, to bring down adversarial states and
movements. The blockades of Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran are examples. So, the
hybrid war concept suggests that wars are carried out by other, less visible,
means.
Third, much of the discourse on the US role in the world replicates the
bipolar, superpower narrative of the Cold War. Only now the enemy is China. As
Alfred McCoy has pointed out (In the Shadows of the American Empire, 2017), the
United States in the twenty first century sees its economic hegemony being
undermined by Chinese economic development and global reach. To challenge this,
McCoy argues, the United States has taken on a project to recreate its military
hegemony: AI, a space force, biometrics, new high tech aircraft etc. If the US
cannot maintain its hegemony economically, it will have to do so militarily.
This position is the centerpiece of the recent CFR Task Force Report.
Finally, during the last decade there has emerged
rising resistance to US/European global hegemony, such that some theorists (and
US foreign policy elites) believe that today a global transformation of power
is occurring, a centerpiece of which is the rise of the Global South. In the
spirit of the 1950s Non-aligned Movement countries such as China, Russia, India,
Brazil, and South Africa (the BRICS) have begun to talk about increased
cooperation around the transformation of
currencies and commerce, foreign assistance, and technological cooperation. The
Trump Administration’s kidnapping of the president of Venezuela, threats
against Cuba, Mexico, Colombia, and others, and now a war on Iran
are designed to forestall the rise of the Global South.
Imperial Policies in Trump's First Term
Recognizing these continuities in United States foreign policy, commentators
appropriately recognized the idiosyncrasies of foreign policy in the first
Trump administration. He reached out to North Korea and Russia (which had the
potential of reducing tensions in Asia and Central Europe). He rhetorically
claimed that the United States should withdraw military forces from trouble
spots around the world, including the Middle East. He declared that the United
States could not be “the policeman of the world,” a declaration made by former
President Nixon as he escalated bombing of Vietnam and initiated plans to overthrow
the Allende regime in Chile. Some of these measures which seemed to
contradict the Cold War policy agenda Trump was inappropriately criticized by
Democrats and others. Tension-reduction on the Korean Peninsula, for example,
should have been encouraged.
However, while Trump moved in one direction, he almost
immediately undermined the policies he had ordered. His announced withdrawal
from Syria, while in the abstract a sign of a more realistic assessment of US
military presence in the Middle East was coupled with a direct or implied
invitation to the Turkish military to invade Northeast Syria to defeat the
Kurds. Also, at the same time he was withdrawing troops from Syria, the Defense
Department announced the United States was sending support troops to Saudi
Arabia. He withdrew from the accord with Iran on nuclear weapons and the Paris
Climate Change agreement. Time after time, one foreign policy decision was
contradicted by another. These contradictions occurred over and over with
allies as well as traditional adversaries. Sometimes policies seemed to be made
with little historical awareness and without sufficient consultation with
professional diplomats.
Imperial Policies in the Second Trump Term
Candidate Trump ran for reelection in 2024 claiming
that the US role in the world (at least
outside the Western Hemisphere) should be reduced. His would adopt an
"America First" strategy.
During his first year he engaged in tariff wars,
supported dramatic increases in military expenditures, and under the guise of
pursuing peace gave support to Israel in its genocidal war against the
Palestinian people and continued both to support the Ukrainian military effort
and negotiations with the Russians as brutal war in Ukraine continued. During
his first year in office the United States bombed eight countries. And after
the administration issued its National Security Strategy Document in November
2025, largely endorsed the drive for remaining the hegemonic power in the
Western Hemisphere (the Monroe Doctrine 2 or the "Donroe Doctrine")
while calling for arming the world to challenge growing Chinese power.
And while the world continued to process Trump's
blustery statements, contradictory calls to action, seemingly words and acts to
insult the traditional allies, a veritable "mad man" approach to US
foreign policy, he made war on Venezuela and carried out the kidnapping of
Venezuela's President and wife.
Subsequently, he has alluded to taking out regimes in
Cuba, Colombia, and Mexico, running the Venezuelan government-particularly its
oil sector, and seizing Greenland from NATO ally, Denmark. And it cannot
be forgotten that the Trump Administration and its sallies in Congress
authorized a trillion-dollar military budget for 2026.
Processing the Trump foreign policies one is
reminded of the old Nixon idea, the so-called “madman theory.” "Trump
thinks that he can frighten and thus deter opponents by appearing unhinged—an
idea that political scientists call the madman theory. As Trump once boasted,
Chinese President Xi Jinping would
never risk a blockade of Taiwan while he is president because Xi “knows I’m
fucking crazy," (Keren Yarhi-Milo, "How Trump's Foreign Policy is
Ruining American Credibility," Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2025)
(Nixon allegedly wanted to appear mad so that
adversaries would be deterred from acting in ways contrary to US interests out
of fear of random responses. For a useful discussion of the "madman
theory" see below:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madman_theory#:~:text=International%20relations%20scholars%20have%20been,failed%20to%20win%20coercive%20disputes.)
Working for Peace in the 21st Century
The contradictory character of Trump foreign policy has left the peace movement
befuddled. How does it respond to Trump’s occasional acts that go against the
traditional imperial grain while he acts impetuously increasing the dangers of
war? How does the peace movement participate in the construction of a
progressive majority that justifiably seeks to overturn the Trump era and all
that it stands for: climate disaster, growing economic inequality, racism,
sexism, homophobia, and hybrid war? Perhaps the task for the peace movement is
to include, in the project of building a progressive majority, ideas about
challenging the US as an imperial power, proclaiming that a progressive agenda
requires the dismantling of the permanent war economy.
Without illusions, the peace movement must participate in politics: which
includes the electoral arena and lobbying for policy changes including
rekindling the War Powers Act and cutting the trillion dollar military budget..
Articulating a peace agenda, demanding that politicians running for office at
all levels embrace it, and convincingly demonstrating that politicians who do not embrace it will be held accountable. Meanwhile, by articulating a peace
platform, activists will be participating in a broad educational effort to
construct a majority “people for peace.”
Finally, peace and social justice movements must
articulate and embrace truly global policies of solidarity in the spirit of the
Non-aligned Movement, the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, commitments to
human rights, environmental protections, and support for those movements
in the Global South that are pursuing the rights of sovereignty and social and
economic development. While flawed the United Nations system, with its multiplicity of
political, social, economic, and legal organizations provide the skeletal form
of a New World Order.
These are truly troubled times, with to a substantial
degree the survival of humanity and nature at stake. The war system is a
significant part of what the struggle is about and every avenue must be used to
challenge it. Whether it is the mad men theory or traditional imperialism that
drives US pursuit of global hegemony or both, it must be stopped.
Now the priority is to stop the killings in Iran.
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