Harry Targ
In
the missile crisis the Kennedys played their dangerous game skillfully….But all
their skill would have been to no avail if in the end Khrushchev had preferred
his prestige, as they preferred theirs, to the danger of a world war. In this
respect we are all indebted to Khrushchev. (I.F. Stone,
“What If Khrushchev Hadn’t Backed Down?” in In
a Time of Torment, Vintage, 1967).
The
Kennedy Administration Goes to the Brink of Nuclear War
The period between the failed Bay of Pigs invasion,
the announcement of the Alliance of Progress economic assistance program, and
the Cuban Missile Crisis was one of escalating hostilities. Fidel Castro
declared Cuba a Socialist state. The United States pressured members of the
Organization of American States (OAS) to expel Cuba. The CIA began campaigns to
assassinate the Cuban leader and President Kennedy initiated the complete
economic blockade that exists until today. In addition, Castro warned that the
U.S. was continuing to plan for another invasion. The Soviet Union began
providing more economic and military support to the Cubans, including
anti-aircraft missiles and jet aircraft.
In October, 1962, U.S. spy planes sighted the
construction of Soviet surface-to-air missile installations and the presence of
Soviet medium-range bombers on Cuban soil. These sightings were made after
Republican leaders had begun to attack Kennedy for allowing a Soviet military
presence on the island. Kennedy had warned the Soviets in September not to
install “offensive” military capabilities in Cuba. Photos indicated that the
Soviets had also begun to build ground-to-ground missile installations on the
island, which Kennedy defined as “offensive” and a threat to national security.
After securing the photographs Kennedy assembled a
special team of advisors, known as EXCOM, to discuss various responses the
United States might make. He excluded any strategy that prioritized taking the
issue to the United Nations for resolution.
After much deliberation EXCOM focused on two policy
responses: a strategic air strike against Soviet targets in Cuba or a blockade
of incoming Soviet ships coupled with threats of further action if the Soviet
missiles were not withdrawn. Both options had a high probability of escalating
to nuclear war if the Soviet Union refused to back down.
High drama, much of it televised, followed the
initiation of a naval blockade of Soviet ships heading across the Atlantic to
Cuba. Fortunately, the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, sent
notes to the President that led to a tacit agreement between the two leaders
whereby Soviet missiles would be withdrawn from Cuba and the United States
would promise not to invade Cuba to overthrow the Castro government. In
addition, the President indicated that obsolete U.S. missiles in Turkey would
be disassembled over time.
Most scholars argue that the missile crisis
constituted Kennedy’s finest hour as statesman and diplomat. They agree with
the administration view that the missiles constituted a threat to U.S.
security, despite Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s claim in EXCOM
meetings that the missiles did not change the strategic balance between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Most of these scholars have agreed that the
symbolic value of the installation of Soviet missiles could have had grave
consequences for U.S. “credibility.”
Given the importance of the missiles, leading social
scientists have written that the Kennedy team carefully considered a multitude
of policy responses. EXCOM did not ignore competing analyses, as had been done
in the decisional process prior to the Bay of Pigs. The blockade policy that
was adopted, experts believe, constituted a rational application of force that
it was hoped would lead to de-escalation of tensions. All observers agreed that
the United States and the Soviet Union had gone to the brink of nuclear war.
Even the President estimated that there was a fifty percent probability of
full-scale nuclear war.
In the end the Soviets withdrew their missiles.
Analysts said the Soviet Union suffered a propaganda defeat for putting the
missiles on Cuban soil in the first place and then withdrawing them after U.S.
threats. Khrushchev was criticized by the Chinese government and within a year
he was ousted from leadership in the Soviet Union.
In the light of this U.S. “victory,” Kennedy has
been defined as courageous and rational. The real meaning of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, however, is different, even fifty
years after the event. The crisis actually suggests that the United States quest
to maintain and enhance its empire would lead it to go to any extreme, even
nuclear war, to defend the interests of capitalism. To avoid serious losses,
whether symbolic or material, for capitalism, any policy was justified.
Further, in terms of U.S. politics, Kennedy was
calculating the effects of the missiles on the chances for his party to retain
control of Congress in 1962. A second “defeat” over Cuba (the Bay of Pigs was
the first) would have heightened the opposition’s criticisms of his foreign
policy.
Finally, in personal terms, Kennedy was driven by
the need to establish a public image as courageous and powerful in confronting
the Soviets. Khrushchev had spoken harshly to him at a summit meeting in Vienna
in 1961 and Castro had been victorious at the Bay of Pigs. The President’s own
“credibility” had been damaged and a show of force in October, 1962, was
necessary for his career.
Because of imperialism, politics, and personal
political fortunes, the world almost went to nuclear war fifty years ago. As
I.F. Stone suggested shortly after the crisis, nuclear war was avoided because
the Soviet Union chose to withdraw from the tense conflict rather than to
engage in it further.
National Security Archives files referred to in an
earlier blog suggest, “the historical record shows that the decisions leading to
the crisis which almost brought nuclear war have been repeated over and over
again since the early 1960s” ( www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/). The danger of the unabashed and irresponsible use of force and
the legitimation of the idea that diplomacy can be conducted using nuclear
weapons and other devastating weapons systems still represents a threat to
human survival.
These comments were adapted from Harry
Targ, Strategy of an Empire in Decline:
Cold War II, 1986. It is the third essay in a series on “The Cuba Story”
available at www.heartlandradical.blogspot.com.
