(Revised from a post of October 9, 2012)
Harry Targ
“The Russian and US presidents should identify more ambitious
and comprehensive limits on nuclear weapons and delivery systems by the end of
2022. They should both agree to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons by limiting
their roles, missions, and platforms, and decrease budgets accordingly.” https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/?utm_source=Google&utm_medium=Ads&utm_campaign=SearchAds&utm_content=DoomsdayClock_2022Statement&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIqu_uoKvd-gIVH8mUCR0uSwo1EAAYASAAEgKPFPD_BwE
“just
as the full destructive implications of climate change threatening the very
existence of humanity are in large part denied by the powers that be, so are
the full planetary effects of nuclear war, which scientific research about
nuclear winter tells us will effectively annihilate the population of every
continent on Earth.” (John Bellamy Foster, https://peoplesworld.org/article/stopping-the-nuclear-war-danger-must-be-at-the-top-of-a-peace-agenda/
In the missile crisis the Kennedys
played their dangerous game skillfully….But all their skill would have been to
no avail if in the end Khrushchev had preferred his prestige, as they preferred
theirs, to the danger of a world war. In this respect we are all indebted to
Khrushchev. ”(I.F. Stone, “What If Khrushchev Hadn’t Backed Down?”
In a Time of Torment, Vintage, 1967).
The Kennedy Administration Goes to the Brink of
Nuclear War
The period between the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April,
1961, the implementation of the Alliance of Progress economic assistance program,
and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962 was one of escalating
hostilities. Fidel Castro declared Cuba a Socialist state. The United States
pressured members of the Organization of American States (OAS) to expel Cuba.
The CIA began campaigns to assassinate the Cuban leader and President Kennedy
initiated the complete economic blockade that exists until today. In addition,
Castro warned that the U.S. was continuing to plan for another invasion (called
“Operation Mongoose” and authorized by President Kennedy in November 1961), During
this period, the Soviet Union began providing more economic and military
support to the Cubans, including anti-aircraft missiles and jet aircraft.
In October 1962, U.S. spy planes sighted the construction of
Soviet surface-to-air missile installations and the presence of Soviet
medium-range bombers on Cuban soil. These sightings were made after Republican
leaders had begun to attack Kennedy for allowing a Soviet military presence on
the island. Kennedy had warned the Soviets in September not to install
“offensive” military capabilities in Cuba. Photos indicated that the Soviets
had also begun to build ground-to-ground missile installations on the island,
which Kennedy defined as “offensive” and a threat to national security.
After securing the photographs Kennedy assembled a special
team of advisors, known as EXCOM, to discuss various responses the United
States might make. He excluded any strategy that prioritized taking the
issue to the United Nations for resolution.
After much deliberation EXCOM focused on two policy
responses: a strategic air strike against Soviet targets in Cuba or a blockade
of incoming Soviet ships coupled with threats of further action if the Soviet
missiles were not withdrawn. Both options had a high probability of escalating
to nuclear war if the Soviet Union refused to back down.
High drama, much of it televised, followed the initiation of
a naval blockade of Soviet ships heading across the Atlantic to Cuba.
Fortunately, the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, sent notes to
the President that led to a tacit agreement between the two leaders whereby
Soviet missiles would be withdrawn from Cuba and the United States would
promise not to invade Cuba to overthrow the Castro government. In addition, the
President indicated that obsolete U.S. missiles in Turkey would be disassembled
over time. And some of the negotiations leading to the de-escalation of
tensions had proceeded in so-called “back channels,” in secret.
Can We Rely on Leaders?
Most scholars argue that the missile crisis constituted
Kennedy’s finest hour as statesman and diplomat. They agree with the
administration view that the missiles constituted a threat to U.S. security,
despite Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s claim in EXCOM meetings that the
missiles did not change the strategic balance between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Most of these scholars have agreed that the symbolic value of the
installation of Soviet missiles could have had grave consequences for U.S.
“credibility.”
Given the importance of the missiles, leading social
scientists have written that the Kennedy team carefully considered a multitude
of policy responses. EXCOM did not ignore competing analyses, as had been done
in the decisional process prior to the Bay of Pigs. The blockade policy that
was adopted, experts believe, constituted a rational application of force that
it was hoped would lead to de-escalation of tensions. But all observers agreed
that the United States and the Soviet Union had gone to the brink of nuclear
war. Even the President estimated that there was a fifty percent probability of
full-scale nuclear war.
In the end the Soviets withdrew their missiles. Analysts
said the Soviet Union suffered a propaganda defeat for putting the missiles on
Cuban soil in the first place and then withdrawing them after U.S. threats.
Khrushchev was criticized by the Chinese government and within a year he was
ousted from leadership in the Soviet Union.
Is Risking Nuclear War Ever Justified?
In the light of this U.S. “victory,” Kennedy has been
defined as courageous and rational. The real meaning of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, however, is different, even sixty years after the event. The
crisis suggests that the United States quest to maintain and enhance its empire
would lead it to go to any extreme, even nuclear war, to defend the interests
of capitalism. To avoid serious losses, whether symbolic or material, for
capitalism, any policy was justified.
Further, in terms of U.S. politics, Kennedy was calculating
the effects of the missiles on the chances for his party to retain control of
Congress in 1962. A second “defeat” over Cuba (the Bay of Pigs was the first)
would have heightened the opposition’s criticisms of his foreign policy.
Finally, in personal terms, Kennedy was driven by the need
to establish a public image as courageous and powerful in confronting the
Soviets. Khrushchev had spoken harshly to him at a summit meeting in Vienna in
1961 and Castro had been victorious at the Bay of Pigs. The President’s own
“credibility” had been damaged and a show of force in October 1962, was
necessary for his career.
Because of imperialism, politics, and personal political
fortunes, the world almost went to nuclear war sixty years ago. As I.F. Stone
suggested shortly after the crisis, nuclear war was avoided because the Soviet
Union chose to withdraw from the tense conflict rather than to engage in it
further.
National Security Archives files subsequently suggested that
“the historical record shows that the decisions leading to the crisis which
almost brought nuclear war have been repeated over and over again since the
early 1960s” ( www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/).
The danger of the unabashed and irresponsible use of force and the legitimation
of the idea that diplomacy can be conducted using nuclear weapons and other
devastating weapons systems still represents a threat to human survival.
These comments were adapted from Harry Targ, Strategy of an Empire in Decline: Cold War II, 1986. It is the third essay in a series on “The Cuba Story” available at https://heartlandradical.blogspot.com/2022/04/the-cubaunited-states-story-1959-1962.html?fbclid=IwAR0c7AE_Xa8gFUobC0VdZ-1COC2SPW-Ib3bH1lBF6n2O4oS380R7gElIGDo
